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Abstract
Our purpose is to investigate how the interplay between trade, commuting
and communication costs shapes the economy at both the interregional and
intraurban levels. Speciﬁcally, we study how economic integration aﬀects the
internal structure of cities and show how decentralizing the production and
consumption of goods in secondary employment centers allows ﬁrms located
in a large city to maintain their predominance. Several new results in both
economic geography and urban economics are established, which all agree with
empirical evidence.
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11 Introduction
Cities are major actors in the process of trade. It is, therefore, fundamental to
understand (i) how the intensity of trade is inﬂuenced by their size and structure
and, conversely, (ii) how economic integration aﬀects the internal structure of cities.
This is what we undertake in this paper by modelling the interplay between trade
costs, commuting costs and communication costs. Our approach, which combines
basic ingredients from urban economics and new economic geography, explains how
decentralizing the production of goods in secondary employment centers may allow
large cities to keep a large share of ﬁrms and jobs.
Our starting point is that ﬁrms’ performances are aﬀected by the level of housing
and commuting costs, which we call “urban costs”. This occurs through the land
rent they pay to occupy central urban locations, and through the higher wages
they have to pay to their workers to compensate them for their longer commutes
and/or higher land rents. Hence, high urban costs render ﬁrms less competitive on
local and foreign markets alike. As a result, despite scale economies arising from
urban agglomeration (Duranton and Puga, 2004), increasing urban costs could shift
employment from large monocentric cities either to their suburbs or to distant and
smaller cities, where these costs are lower, at least once trade costs have suﬃciently
declined to permit large scale exports to distant markets. In other words, economic
integration could well challenge the supremacy of large cities in favor of small cities.
The main point we wish to stress in this paper is that the emergence of subcenters
within cities is a powerful strategy for large cities to maintain their attractiveness.
Despite the many advantages provided by the inner city through a good access
to highly specialized services (Porter, 1995), ﬁrms or developers may choose to
form secondary employment centers, enterprise zones, or edge cities (Henderson
and Mitra, 1996). In this way, ﬁrms are able to pay lower wages and land rents
while retaining most of the beneﬁts generated by large urban agglomerations. And,
indeed, Timothy and Wheaton (2001) report large variations in wages according
to intraurban location (15% higher in central Boston than in outlying work zones,
18% between central Minneapolis and the fringe counties). As they enjoy living on
larger plots and/or move along with ﬁrms, workers may also want to live in suburbia
(Glaeser and Kahn, 2004). Consequently, the creation of subcenters within a city,
i.e. the formation of a polycentric city, appears to be a natural way to alleviate the
burden of urban costs. It is, therefore, no surprise that Anas et al. (1998) observe
that “polycentricity is an increasingly prominent feature of the landscape”.1
Thus, the escalation of urban costs in large cities seems to prompt a redeployment
of activities in a polycentric pattern, while smaller cities retain their monocentric
shape. However, for this to happen, ﬁrms set up in the secondary centers must
maintain a very good access to the main urban center, which requires low communi 
cation costs. Indeed, as pointed out by Schwartz (1993), about half of the business
services consumed by US ﬁrms located in suburbia are supplied in city centers. As
a result, by focusing on urban and communication costs, we recognize that both
1To illustrate, Giuliano and Small (1991) identify 29 job centers in Los Angeles, McMillen and
McDonald (1998) ﬁnd 15 in Chicago, and Creveso and Wu (1997) count 22 for the San Francisco
Bay Area.
2agglomeration and dispersion may take two quite separate forms because they are
now compounded by centralization or decentralization of activities within the same
city. Such a distinction is crucial for understanding the interaction between cities
and trade.
To achieve our goal, we develop a two region model where regions have a spa 
tial extension that imposes commuting and communication costs whereas interre 
gional shipments of commodities imply trade costs. Unlike Helpman (1998), Tabuchi
(1998) and others, our framework allows cities to be polycentric. Our model thus
sheds light on some important concrete issues that have been pretty much over 
looked until now. To show it, we organize our main conclusions around two main
ideas: (i) local factors may change the global organization of the economy, whereas
(ii) global forces may aﬀect the local organization of cities. This interaction arises
because the spatial organization of production and employment may take diﬀerent
forms as either a single polycentric city or two monocentric cities may emerge, thus
yielding very contrasted economic landscapes and trade patterns. Regarding the
ﬁrst idea, we focus on commuting and communication costs. When these costs are
high, the economic landscape is likely to be formed by several small cities trading
diﬀerentiated varieties. By contrast, when commuting and/or communication costs
are suﬃciently low, a single and large polycentric city emerges. In particular, by
facilitating the formation of secondary centers, the development of New Information
and Communication Technologies (in short NICTs) may prevent the re dispersion
of activities between regions that a deep economic integration is expected to trigger
(Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004).
Concerning the second idea, our thought experiment is about trade costs. When
trade costs decrease steadily, agglomeration within a city emerges gradually. This is
because the decentralization of jobs in a polycentric city allows ﬁrms to pay lower
wages. This result agrees with the formation of megalopolises in which employment
is decentralized in several centers that all belong to the same metropolitan area
(MacMillen and Smith, 2003). Interestingly, such an outcome may still prevail
even when trade costs decrease suﬃciently for the full dispersion of activities to
be again a stable equilibrium, thus showing in a very neat way the prevalence of
the phenomenon of hysteresis in urban structures. Yet, when trade costs fall below
some lower threshold, the agglomeration becomes partial in that it loses jobs to the
beneﬁt of smaller cities. During this process, the internal structure of the megalopolis
changes gradually in that the secondary business districts (in short SBDs) ﬁrst gain
more jobs, whereas the central business district (in short CBD) then recovers some
of its importance.
In the sections that follow, we ﬁrst describe our modeling strategy (section 2).
The intracity equilibrium is characterized in section 3, whereas the subsequent sec 
tion analyzes the urban system when cities have given structures. In section 5, we
study the impact of trade and communication costs on the size and structure of
cities. Section 6 concludes.
32 The model
2.1 The spatial economy
Consider an economy with two regions, labelled r = 1,2, separated by a given
physical distance, one sector and two primary goods, labor and land. Each region
can be urbanized by accommodating ﬁrms and workers within a city, and is formally
described by a one dimensional space X. Whenever a city exists, it has a CBD
located at the origin 0 ∈ X. One would expect us to explain why this CBD exist
as well as why ﬁrms want to be together when they form a SBD. Doing that would
make our analysis much more involved from the technical point of view, without
adding much to our understanding of the space economy. Indeed, the reasons for
urban clusters to arise have been well explored in the literature and our model has
nothing new to add to what is known in this domain. By contrast, we determine
both the size and structure of each city.2
Firms are free to locate in the CBD or to set up in the suburbs of the metro
where they form a SBD. Both the CBD and SBDs are assumed to be dimensionless.3
As mentioned in the introduction, the higher order functions (speciﬁc local public
goods and nontradeable business to business services such as marketing, banking,
insurance) are still mainly located in CBDs. Hence, when some ﬁrms set up in a
SBD, they must incur a cost K > 0, which we call communication cost, for using
such services. Because communicating mainly requires the building of facilities that
have the nature of ﬁxed costs, we may suppose that this cost is independent on
the CBD SBD distance. This assumption vastly simpliﬁes the analysis of the land
market (see Section 3.1). Further, making the communication cost dependent on the
CBD SBD distance does not aﬀect qualitatively our results provided that this cost
does not increase rapidly with distance   a very plausible assumption   but makes
the analytical expressions more cumbersome. However, recognizing the fact that
communication costs between the CBD and a SBD are distance sensitive implies
that the CBD and SBD residential areas are adjacent. This is why we will assume
below that these two areas are adjacent, despite the fact that it does not matter
whether or not they are so in the case of a constant communication cost.
In what follows, the superscript C is used to describe variables related to the
CBD, whereas S describes the variables associated with a SBD. Without loss of
generality, we focus on the right hand side of the city, the left hand side being
perfectly symmetrical. Distances and locations are expressed by the same variable
x measured from the CBD located at x = 0 in city r = 1,2 whereas the SBD, if
any, is established at xS
r > 0, which is endogenous. Both the CBD and the SBD are
surrounded by residential areas occupied by workers. Furthermore, as the distance
between the CBD and SBD is small compared to the intercity distance, we disregard
the intracity transport cost of goods. Finally, as creating a new subcenter requires
2Thus, we diﬀer from Fujita et al. (1999) because cities have a spatial extension and an en 
dogenous structure. Unlike them, however, the inter city distance is given. We also diﬀer from
Henderson (1974) who considers monocentric cities and zero transport costs between cities.
3In Cavailhes et al. (2004), we suppose that ﬁrms consume land, thus implying that clusters
have a spatial size. This makes the analytical treatment of the model more cumbersome without
changing the nature of our results.
4a positive ﬁxed cost (Glaeser and Kahn, 2004), we ﬁnd it convenient to restrict
ourselves to the case of two SBDs. It should be clear, however, that the extension
to more SBDs does not generate new major insights.
Under those various assumptions, the location and size of the SBDs as well as
the size of the CBD are endogenously determined. In other words, apart from the
assumed existence of the CBD, the internal structure of each city is endogenous.
2.2 Workers
The economy is endowed with L mobile workers. The welfare of a worker depends
on her consumption of the following three goods. The ﬁrst good is unproduced and
homogenous.4 It is assumed to be costlessly tradeable and chosen as the num´ eraire.
The second good is produced as a continuum n of varieties of a horizontally diﬀeren 
tiated good under monopolistic competition and increasing returns, using labor as
the only input. Any variety of this good can be shipped from one city to the other
at a unit cost of τ > 0 units of the num´ eraire. The third good is land; without loss
of generality, we set the opportunity cost of land to zero.
Each worker living in city r consumes a residential plot of ﬁxed area chosen as
the unit of surface.5 The worker also chooses a quantity q(i) of variety i ∈ [0,n], and
a quantity q0 of the num´ eraire. She is endowed with one unit of labor and q0 > 0
units of the num´ eraire. The initial endowment q0 is supposed to be large enough
for her consumption of the num´ eraire to be strictly positive at the market outcome.
Each worker commutes to her employment center   without cross commuting   and
bears a unit commuting cost given by t > 0, so that for the worker located at x the
commuting cost is either tx or t
￿ ￿x − xS
r
￿ ￿ according to the employment center.
The budget constraint of an individual residing at x ∈ X in city r and working
in the corresponding CBD can then be written as follows:
￿ n
0
pr(i)q(i)di + q0 + RC
r (x) + tx = wC
r + q0 (1)
where RC
r (x) is the land rent prevailing at a distance x from the CBD. The bud 
get constraint of an individual working in the SBD is obtained by replacing tx by
t
￿ ￿x − xS
r
￿ ￿, RC
r (x) by RS
r (x), and wC
r by wS
r . Thus, as in Fujita and Ogawa (1980),
commuting costs and wages are endogenously determined by the spatial distribution
of ﬁrms and workers within the city.
Preferences over the diﬀerentiated product and the num´ eraire are identical across
workers and represented by a quasi linear utility encapsulating a quadratic sub 
utility:
















where α > 0 and β > γ > 0. The condition β > γ implies that workers have a
preference for variety.
4The model can easily be extended by introducing a second sector producing the homogenous
good under constant returns and perfect competition, using an immobile factor.
5Allowing for a variable lot size makes the analysis much more involved without aﬀecting the
nature of our results. See Tabuchi (1998) for a study of the monocentric city case.
52.3 Firms
Technology in manufacturing is such that producing q(i) units of variety i requires
a given number φ of labor units.6 There are no scope economies so that, due to
increasing returns to scale, there is a one to one relationship between ﬁrms and
varieties. Thus, the total number of ﬁrms is given by n = L/φ. Labor market
clearing implies that the number of ﬁrms located (or varieties produced) in city r is
such that nr = λrn, where λr stands for the share of workers residing in r.
Denote by ΠC
r (resp., ΠS
r ) the proﬁt of a ﬁrm set up in the CBD (resp., the SBD)
of city r. Let θr be the share of ﬁrms located in the CBD of city r and, therefore, by
(1 − θr)/2 the share of ﬁrms in its right hand side SBD. When the ﬁrm producing
variety i is located in the CBD of city r, its proﬁt function is given by:
ΠC
r (i) = Ir(i) − φwC
r (3)
where Ir(i) stands for the ﬁrm’s revenue earned from local sales and from exports
(see (13) below). When the ﬁrm set up in the SBD of the same city, its proﬁt
function becomes:
ΠS
r(i) = Ir(i) − φwS
r − K (4)
where the ﬁrm’s revenue is the same as in the CBD because shipping varieties within
the city is costless so that prices and outputs do not depend on ﬁrm’s location in
the city. Those two expressions encapsulate the trade oﬀ faced by ﬁrms located in
city r: by locating at the SBD, ﬁrms are able to pay a lower wage to workers, but
must incur the communication cost K.
2.4 Market structure
Solving the budget constraint for the num´ eraire consumption, plugging the corre 
sponding expression into (2) and taking the ﬁrst order condition with respect to q(i)
yields
α − (β − γ)q(i) − γ
￿ n
0
q(j)dj = p(i) i ∈ [0,n].
The demands for a variety i produced in city r by a worker living in city r and a
worker living in city s can then be written, respectively, as follows:
qrr(i) = a − (b + cn)prr(i) + cPr (5)
qrs(i) = a − (b + cn)prs(i) + cPs (6)
where prr(i) (resp., prs(i)) denotes the price a variety i ﬁrm located in city r charges
to consumers living in city r (resp., city s  = r) and Pr the average price (up to n)







psr(i)di s  = r. (7)
6When a second sector is considered, we may assume that the production of q(i) units of variety
i requires mq(i) units of the immobile factor. Without loss of generality, we may then set m = 0
(Ottaviano et al., 2002).
6Furthermore, we have a ≡ αb, b ≡ 1/[β+(n−1)γ] and c ≡ [γ/(β−γ)]b. Parameter a
expresses the desirability of the diﬀerentiated product with respect to the num´ eraire
and may, therefore, be viewed as a measure of the size of this market; b gives the
link between individual and industry demands: when b rises, consumers become
more sensitive to price diﬀerences. Finally, parameter c is an inverse measure of
the degree of product diﬀerentiation between varieties; when c → ∞, varieties are
perfect substitutes, whereas they are independent for c = 0.
Firm i located in city r faces a downward sloping demand in city r and city
s  = r:
Qrr(i) = λrLqrr(i) Qrs(i) = λsLqrs(i)
where qrr(i) and qrs(i) are given by (5) and (6), respectively.
As empirical evidence suggests that ﬁrms practice some form of spatial price
discrimination (Greenhut, 1981; Engel and Rogers, 1996; Haskel and Wolf, 2001),
we assume that markets are spatially segmented, which means that each ﬁrm chooses
a delivered price speciﬁc to the city in which its variety is sold. As the price of a
variety does not vary within a city, the total revenue of ﬁrm i located in city r is
given by
Ir(i) = prr(i)Qrr(i) + [prs(i) − τ]Qrs(i).
Because there is a continuum of ﬁrms, each ﬁrm has a negligible impact on the
market outcome in the sense that it may accurately ignore its inﬂuence on, and
hence reactions from, other ﬁrms. However, aggregate market conditions of some
kind (here the price index Pr) aﬀects any single ﬁrm. This deﬁnes a setting in which
individual ﬁrms are not competitive (in the classic economic sense of having inﬁnite
demand elasticity) but, at the same time, they have no strategic interactions with
one another. Because varieties are symmetric, all ﬁrms located in the same city














s  = r. (9)
It thus appears that the equilibrium price prevailing in a city decreases with the
number of ﬁrms located there, but increases with the level of trade costs. Finally,
even though factor prices do not enter (8) (9) because they have the nature of a ﬁxed
cost, they have a negative impact on the number of ﬁrms set up in city r, whence
an indirect positive impact on equilibrium prices.
Substituting the equilibrium prices (8) (9) into the demands (5) (6) and using
(7), the equilibrium consumption levels can be expressed as follows:
q∗
rr = a − bp∗
rr + cnτ/2 (10)
q∗
rs = q∗
ss − (b + cn)τ/2. (11)
7Not surprisingly, high trade costs raise the local demand for each locally produced
variety at the expense of varieties produced in the other city. This substitution eﬀect
decreases when varieties becomes more diﬀerentiated.



























Both (12) and (13) depend on the distribution of ﬁrms and workers between the two
cities.
It remains to determine the conditions to be imposed on τ for trade to occur
between cities at the equilibrium prices regardless of the interregional distribution
of ﬁrms and workers. This is so if and only if the equilibrium demand q∗
rs is positive
for any distribution of workers. It is readily veriﬁed that this condition is equivalent
to:
τ < τtrade ≡
2aφ
2bφ + cL
which is assumed to hold throughout the paper. This condition also guarantees that
it is always proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to export to the other city (p∗
rs − τ > 0).
To sum up, we consider a full ﬂedged general equilibrium model involving labor,
land as well as a diﬀerentiated product and a homogeneous good. At the global level,
increasing returns at the plant level are the agglomeration force whereas urban costs
are the dispersion force. At the city level, communication costs act as agglomeration
forces, whereas commuting costs act as dispersion forces. In the next section, we
study the city equilibrium within one city before considering the case of an urban
system in the subsequent section.
3 Decentralization within a city
A city equilibrium is such that each individual maximizes her utility subject to her
budget constraint, each ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts and markets clear. Individuals
choose their workplace (CBD or SBD) and their residential location with respect to
given wages and land rents. Within each workplace (CBD or SBD), the equilibrium
wages are determined by a bidding process in which ﬁrms compete for workers by
oﬀering them higher wages until no ﬁrm can proﬁtably enter the market. Given
such equilibrium wages and the location of workers, ﬁrms choose to locate either in
the CBD or in the SBD. At the city equilibrium, no ﬁrm has an incentive to change
place within the city, and no worker wants to change her working place and/or
her residence. In this section, we analyze such an equilibrium, taking as ﬁxed the
number of workers as given. To ease the burden of notation, we drop the subscript
r.
83.1 Land rents, wages and workplaces
Within each city, a worker chooses her location so as to maximize (2) under the
constraint (1). Let ΨC(x) and ΨS(x) be the bid rent at x ∈ X of an individual
working respectively in the CBD and the SBD. Land is allocated to the highest







Denote by y the right endpoint of the residential area formed by people working in
the CBD. Let z1 be the endpoint of the residential area on the left hand side of the
SBD, and z2 the symmetrical residential endpoint, which is also the outer limit of
the city. As discussed above, we assume that the two residential areas are adjacent,











where l is the city size and θ the share of ﬁrms located in the CBD. Note that the bid
rents at y and z2 are equal to zero because the lot size is ﬁxed and the communication
cost K is constant. An illustration of the land rent proﬁle is provided in Figure 1.
Figure 1
Because of the ﬁxed lot size assumption, at the city equilibrium the value of the





is the same regardless of the worker’s location. Then, the budget constraint of an
individual residing at x and working in the CBD implies that wC −R(x) −tx = E,
whereas the budget constraint of an individual working in the SBD is wS − R(x)−
t
￿ ￿x − xS￿ ￿ = E. At the city equilibrium, the worker living at the right endpoint y of
the CBD residential area (or at the left endpoint z1 of the SBD residential area) is
indiﬀerent between working in the CBD or in the SBD, which implies
wC − R(y) − ty = wS − R(z1) − t(xS − z1).
Because y = z1 and R(y) = R(z1) = 0, this becomes




where we have used the expressions of xS and z1 in (14). Thus, the diﬀerence in
the wages paid in the CBD and in the SBD compensates exactly the worker for the
diﬀerence in the corresponding commuting costs. The wage wedge wC−wS is positive
as long as θ > 1/3, that is, the size of the CBD exceeds the size of each SBD (recall
that another SBD exists on the left hand side of the CBD). Observe that a rise in
the population size increases the wage wedge: as the average commuting cost rises,
ﬁrms located in the CBD must pay a higher wage to their workers.
7Utilities being quasi linear, the structure of land ownership across indivuals is immaterial for
our analysis provided that the distribution is atomless.
93.2 Equilibrium wages and the city structure
Regarding the labor markets, the equilibrium wages of workers are determined by
the zero proﬁt condition. In other words, operating proﬁts are completely absorbed
by the wage bill. Hence, the equilibrium wage rates in the CBD and in the SBD
must satisfy the conditions ΠC(wC∗) = 0 and ΠS(wS∗) = 0, respectively. Thus,








Hence wC∗ − wS∗ = K/φ, which means that the equilibrium wage wedge is propor 
tional to the level of the communication cost K.













Observe ﬁrst that θ∗ = 1/3 when K = 0 because the city is formed by three identical
employment centers. Furthermore, when θ∗ < 1, increasing the population size leads
to a decrease in the relative size of the CBD, though its absolute size rises, whereas
both the relative and absolute sizes of the SBD rises. Indeed, increasing the size
of the labor force leads to a more than proportionate increase in the wage rate
prevailing in the CBD. This is because of the corresponding rise in the average
commuting cost. The number of ﬁrms being ﬁxed, this in turn implies that more
ﬁrms choose to set up in the SBD at the expense of the CBD. Last, as long as θ∗ < 1,
the higher the communication costs, the larger the CBD. In the same way, the lower
the commuting costs, the larger the CBD size.
It is readily veriﬁed that the city is monocentric if and only if
t ≤ 2K/φl. (18)
Hence, a polycentric city is more likely to occur when commuting and/or communi-
cation costs are low and the population size is large. This agrees with Anas et al.
(1998) who observe that by the end of the 19th century telephones have made it
possible for US ﬁrms to decentralize, whereas NICTs play nowadays a comparable
role. By contrast, a high degree of increasing returns favors the centralization of
production.
We may summarize the main results of that analysis in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 A city is monocentric if and only if t ≤ 2K/φl. Otherwise, the city
is polycentric.
Finally, it is worth noting that the equilibrium land rents are given by






for x < y (19)
10where we have used the expression of y and the condition ΨC(y) = 0 and by




l + xS − x
￿
for x > xS. (20)
Workers’ bid rents around the SBD are maximized at xS whereas ΨS(z1) = 0. The
gap ΨC(x) − ΨS(|x − xS|) > 0 at any given x rises as the relative size of the CBD
increases. Note also that the households’ bid rents functions ΨC and ΨS in the CBD
and the SBD are identical once the employment centers have the same size, that is,
θ∗ = 1/3.
4 Urban system and intercity trade
Consider now our two city setting in which workers and ﬁrms are free to choose the
city in which they want to live. Let λ be the endogenous share of workers residing
in city 1. A global equilibrium arises at 0 < λ∗ < 1 when the utility diﬀerential
∆V (λ∗) ≡ V1(λ∗) − V2(λ∗) = 0, or at λ∗ = 1 when ∆V (1) ≥ 0, or at λ∗ = 0
when ∆V (0) ≤ 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that λ ≥ 1/2. An interior
equilibrium is stable if and only if the slope of the indirect utility diﬀerential ∆V is
strictly negative in a neighborhood of the equilibrium, i.e., ∂∆V (λ)/∂λ < 0 at λ∗,
whereas an agglomerated equilibrium is stable whenever it exists. In what follows,
we simplify notation by deleting the subscripts 1 and 2, unless explicitly mentioned.
The indirect utility of an individual working in the CBD is given by
V C(λ) = S∗ + wC∗ − CC + q0 (21)
where S∗ is the consumer surplus given by (12) and CC the urban costs borne by
this individual. Using (19), it is readily veriﬁed that




If she works in the SBD, her indirect utility becomes:
V S(λ) = S∗ + wS∗ − CS + q0
where CS now denotes the urban costs the individual bears. Using (20), we have




Two comments are in order. First, the equilibrium allocation of workers and ﬁrms
within each city depends on the spatial distribution of ﬁrms and workers between
cities through the value of λ. Hence, workers are distributed at the city equilibrium
in a way such that
V C(λ) = V S(λ).
Likewise, when λn ﬁrms are established in city 1, ﬁrms are distributed at the city
equilibrium such that ΠC(λ) = ΠS(λ) = 0. Second, when deciding whether or not
11to move from one city to the other, workers know whether the cities of origin and
destination are monocentric and/or polycentric; they also know the land rent that
prevails in each one of them.










and l has been replaced by λL and (1 − λ)L, respectively, in (18).Because λ ≥ 1/2,
we have t1 ≤ t2. Using Proposition 1, it is easily seen that the following three
spatial patterns may emerge: (i) when t < t1, both cities are monocentric, (ii) when
t1 < t < t2, city 1 is polycentric and city 2 is monocentric, and (iii) when t2 < t,
both cities are polycentric. Hence, under dispersion (t1 = t2 = 2ΥK), the two
cities are monocentric if t < 2ΥK and polycentric if t > 2ΥK. Similarly, under
agglomeration (λ = 1), t1 = ΥK and t2 → ∞; thus, agglomeration arises in a
monocentric city when t < ΥK or in a polycentric city when t > ΥK. The following
lemma summarizes those various results.
Lemma 1 For dispersion between two monocentric (resp., polycentric) cities to
arise, it must be that t < 2ΥK (resp., t > 2ΥK). For agglomeration in a monocen-
tric (resp., polycentric) city to arise, it must be that t < ΥK (resp., t > ΥK).
Having this purpose in mind, in order to determine what a global equilibrium
is, we must consider the three forms the utility diﬀerential governing migrations
may take with respect to these patterns. In the following subsections, we study the
global equilibria when cities are (i) monocentric, (ii) polycentric, and (iii) one city is
polycentric and the other monocentric. Note that one region may be empty in each
of those conﬁgurations.
4.1 Monocentric cities
Assume that t < t1 so that both cities are monocentric (θ∗ = 1 for all λ ∈ [1/2,1]).
As mentioned above, the equilibrium wages are given by a bidding process in which
ﬁrms compete for workers by oﬀering them higher wages until no ﬁrm can earn pos 
itive proﬁts, given by (3), in the CBD of either city. Using (12) and the equilibrium
wages given by (29) in the appendix, it is readily veriﬁed that the utility diﬀerential
with two monocentric cities (with subscript mm) is as follows:
∆mmV (λ) ≡ δmm(λ − 1/2) (25)
where
δmm ≡ −ε1τ2 + ε2τ − ε3t
12with
ε1 ≡ (bφ + cL)(6b2φ2 + 6bφcL + c2L2) > 0
ε2 ≡ 4aφ(bφ + cL)(3bφ + 2cL) > 0
ε3 ≡ 2(2bφ + cL)2φ > 0.
Clearly, λ = 1/2 is always a global equilibrium. This equilibrium is stable if and




which is positive for all admissible value of τ because τtrade < ε2/ε1. On the contrary,
when t < tm, agglomeration prevails.
Using Lemma 1, the discussion above may be summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 If t < tm and t < ΥK, there exists a global equilibrium in which
the industry is agglomerated into a single monocentric city. If tm < t < 2ΥK, there
exists a global equilibrium in which the industry is dispersed between two monocentric
cities of equal size.
Note, ﬁrst, that communication costs have to be suﬃciently large to fulﬁll the
condition t < 2ΥK. Agglomeration in a monocentric city may then occur provided
that commuting costs are very low (t < tm). Once commuting costs get larger
(t > tm), the industry is dispersed between two monocentric cities. In other words,
a pattern involving two symmetric and monocentric cities is more likely to emerge
when both commuting and communication costs are high.
However, for the dispersed pattern to arise, it must be that tm < 2ΥK. As
ε2 increases with a whereas ε1, ε3 and ΥK are independent of a, this condition
is satisﬁed when the parameter a does not exceed the unique solution am to the
equation
ε2τ = ε1τ2 + 2ε3ΥK.
In other words, the size of the diﬀerentiated product market cannot be too large,
a < am, for two monocentric cities to be a global equilibrium.
Otherwise, when a > am   hence tm > 2ΥK   the industry is always agglomerated
in a single monocentric city: there is both agglomeration and centralization. This
form of extreme agglomeration arises because the intensiﬁcation of price competition
that such a spatial structure brings about is itself compensated by a suﬃciently large
market size eﬀect (a > am).8
8When the communication cost is arbitrarily large, cities are necessarily monocentric. Proposi 
tion 2 is then equivalent to what Ottaviano et al. (2002) obtain in the case where all workers are
mobile.
134.2 Polycentric cities
We now assume that t > t2 so that both cities are polycentric (with subscript pp).
Hence, θ∗ < 1 for all λ ∈ [1/2,1]. The expression of the equation of motion becomes:
∆ppV (λ) = δpp(λ − 1/2) (26)
where




Again, λ = 1/2 is a global equilibrium. As δmm and δpp are almost identical,
the argument is similar to the one developed in the foregoing subsection. Clearly,
dispersion with two symmetric and polycentric cities prevails when δpp < 0 or,




= 3tm > 0
whereas agglomeration is a spatial equilibrium when t < tp. Hence, using Lemma 1,
we may state:
Proposition 3 If t > tp and t > 2ΥK, there exists a global equilibrium in which
the industry is dispersed between two polycentric cities of equal size. If ΥK < t < tp,
there exists a global equilibrium in which the industry is agglomerated into a single
polycentric city.
In words, when commuting costs are large and communication costs low, ﬁrms
and workers alleviate the burden of urban costs by having two polycentric cities:
there is both dispersion and decentralization. In other words, the spatial organization
of the production of the industry leads to the lowest level of urban costs in the global
economy. Observe that a strong reduction in trade costs leads to low values of tp, thus
fostering the dispersion of the industry, which now takes the form of two polycentric
cities. Note, however, that, because tp exceeds tm, agglomeration is sustainable over
a larger set of t values in the case of polycentric cities than under monocentric cities.
Agglomeration in a polycentric city may also occur when commuting costs take
suﬃciently low values. However, for that outcome to be possible, it must be that
ΥK < tp. It is easy to show that this condition holds if and only if a > ap, where
ap is the unique solution to the equation




Consequently, when the market size eﬀect is strong (a > ap), agglomeration within
a polycentric city takes place. Because ap is smaller than am, agglomeration is sus 
tained for weaker market size eﬀects in the polycentric case than under monocentric
cities. This conﬁrms the idea that dispersion is a less likely outcome when cities have
SBCs.
Note, ﬁnally, that there is multiplicity of equilibria when ΥK < t < 2ΥK and
tm < t < tp as both agglomeration within a single polycentric city (Proposition 2)
14and dispersion between two monocentric cities (Proposition 3) are global equilibria.
This may be viewed as the counterpart of the overlapping domain in which both ag 
glomeration and dispersion coexist in the standard core periphery model (Krugman,
1991).
4.3 Monocentric vs polycentric cities
It remains to consider the case in which cities exhibit diﬀerent spatial structures.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that city 1 is polycentric whereas city 2
is monocentric (θ∗
1 < 1 and θ∗
2 = 1): t1 < t < t2. Note that this condition implies
1/2 < λ < 1 so that the polycentric city hosts the majority of ﬁrms and workers.
The equation of motion   with subscript pm   is now given by














ε1τ2 − ε2τ + ε3 (t − 2ΥK)
￿
.
Since ∆pmV (λ) is both linear and continuous, the intermediate value theo 
rem implies that such the interval (1/2,1) contains a unique equilibrium, given
by λ∗ = −δ2/δ1 ∈ (1/2,1), if and only if the two inequalities ∆pmV (1/2) > 0 and
∆pmV (1) < 0 hold. Furthermore, this equilibrium is stable because ∆pmV (λ) is
monotone decreasing when these two inequalities are satisﬁed, which in turn implies
that δ1 < 0.
Note that ∆pmV (1/2) > 0 is equivalent to −δ2/δ1 > 1/2, whereas ∆pmV (1) < 0
is equivalent to δ1 + δ2 < 0. It is then readily veriﬁed that the former inequality is
itself equivalent to t > 6ΥK, whereas the latter is equivalent to tp−6ΥK < t. Hence,
under these two conditions, λ∗ = −δ2/δ1 ∈ (1/2,1) is a stable interior equilibrium,
thus meaning that the economy involves a large polycentric, which hosts the majority
of ﬁrms and workers, together with a small monocentric city.
By contrast, there is agglomeration in the polycentric city if and only if ∆pmV (1) >
0 because ∆pmV (λ) is linear, which amounts to the condition t < tp − 6ΥK.
Thus, using Proposition 3, we have:
Proposition 4 If t > 6ΥK and t > tp − 6ΥK, there exists a global equilibrium in
which the industry is split between a large polycentric city and a small monocentric
city. If ΥK < t < tp − 6ΥK, there exists a global equilibrium in which the industry
is agglomerated in a single polycentric city.
Hence, a partial agglomeration may emerge as an equilibrium outcome once it is
recognized that SBDs exist. Such a conﬁguration never arises in the standard core 
periphery model. Again, there is multiplicity of equilibria   two polycentric cities
of the same size (Proposition 3) or an asymmetric conﬁguration with a polycentric
city and a monocentric city (Proposition 4)   when t > 6ΥK and t > tp − 6ΥK.
Figure 2 describes the diﬀerent types of intracity and global equilibria in the
(t,K) space, as identiﬁed in Propositions 2, 3 et 4.
15Figure 2
5 Interaction between local and global forces
In this section, we study the impact of changes in commuting costs, communication
costs and trade costs on the location of ﬁrms within and between cities. Our re 
sults are organized around the following two ideas: (i) local factors may well change
the global organization of the economy, whereas (ii) global forces may aﬀect the
local/urban organization of production and employment. We ﬁrst study how a vari 
ation in commuting and/or communication costs aﬀects the space economy. Next,
we will consider the usual thought experiment of new economic geography, namely
the impact of falling trade costs on the spatial distribution of activities, except that
the urban spatial structure now depends on the evolution the interregional distribu 
tion of activities.
5.1 How the local aﬀects the global
Agglomeration seems to be the more likely outcome when commuting costs take
low values. Indeed, agglomeration is always the single spatial equilibrium when
commuting costs fall below tm, but is never an equilibrium when t > tp (see Figure
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θ∗∈[1/3,1)
> 0 j = C,S
where Cj is given by (23). Hence, regardless of the city structure, urban costs
borne by workers decrease as commuting costs fall. Consequently, net wages in 
crease regardless of workers’ residential location. This implies that more workers
and ﬁrms are willing to choose to set up in a single city. This larger concentration
of workers and ﬁrms then makes the agglomeration forces stronger, which in turn
increases workers’ utility. Eventually, all workers end up living in the same city
when commuting costs are suﬃciently low.
It is also worth stressing that increasing (resp., decreasing) commuting costs
does not necessarily induce the decentralization (resp., centralization) of production
within cities. Contrary to what a standard approach would suggest, monocentric
cities may retain their spatial structure when commuting costs take high values. This
is because economic agents react by getting dispersed between two cities, instead of
getting re organized within a polycentric city. For example, when t < tm and t <
16ΥK, Figure 2 shows that the economy involves a single monocentric city. However,
when commuting costs get larger than tm while being lower than 2ΥK, the city
remains monocentric while half the ﬁrms and workers leave it to form a new one
(see Figure 2). Likewise, as shown by Figure 2, a polycentric city may emerge when
commuting costs are suﬃciently low (t < tm). This is because low commuting costs
foster agglomeration, thus raising, all else equal, land rents, and inducing, in ﬁne,
the decentralization of production within the same city.
Consider now the case of decreasing communication costs. When tp > t > tm,
falling communication costs foster agglomeration in a single city as well as disper-
sion within that city. The argument goes as follows. Low values of K trigger the















which means that agglomeration forces are strengthened when communication costs
decline. Hence, the industry is concentrated because low communication costs induce
decentralization within a large city   which may or may not coexist with a small city.
Finally, our setting shows how hysteresis eﬀect may impact on the evolution of the
urban landscape. To this end, consider again the case of decreasing communication
costs together with tp > t > tm. A system of two monocentric cities having the
same size holds as long as t < 2ΥK. Even though agglomeration in a polycentric
city is an alternative equilibrium once 2ΥK > K > ΥK, urban inertia is likely to
imply that the economy remains on the same path with two identical monocentric
cities.9 In this case, the hysteresis eﬀect prevents full agglomeration within a single
city. However, when communication costs reach a suﬃciently low value, the economy
displays agglomeration under the form of a single polycentric city or two asymmetric
cities with one large polycentric city and one small monocentric city. In the latter
case, the equilibrium path does not exhibit any discontinuity: once the large city
exists, its size grows and shrinks smoothly while remaining polycentric. It should
be noted that the economy may not shift to a pattern involving agglomeration in a
single polycentric city, even when K is very low. For that, it suﬃces to have t > tp
because dispersion forces then remain suﬃciently strong.
5.2 How the global aﬀects the local
In order to study the impact of falling trade costs, we re write our main conditions in
terms of t and distinguish the following three cases: (i) t > 2ΥK; (ii) 2ΥK > t > ΥK
and (iii) ΥK > t. The most interesting situation arises when t > ΥK (cases (i) and
(ii)) because it involves potential changes in the urban spatial structure with respect
to the level of trade costs. Indeed, when ΥK > t, no city can be polycentric. In
this case, a gradual fall in trade costs generates the bell shaped curve of spatial
development   the sequence dispersion/agglomeration/re dispersion   obtained in
several models of new economic geography with urban costs (Ottaviano and Thisse,
9Urban inertia is strengthened by the durability of the housing stock, a variable not taken into
account in the present model (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005).
172004). When 2ΥK > t > ΥK, we have at most one polycentric city whereas we
have at least one polycentric city when t > 2ΥK.
Figure 3
When commuting costs are high, Figure 3 shows that the economy may follow
fairly diﬀerent paths.10 As long as t > 2ΥK, the economy may involve one or two
polycentric cities according to the trade cost value; its shifts from agglomeration (and
no trade) to dispersion (and symmetric trade) when trade costs steadily decline, with
a discontinuous change in the spatial pattern. Such an outcome is reminiscent of
what is obtained within diﬀerent frameworks of economic geography with urban costs
and agrees with the bell shaped curve of spatial development. The diﬀerence here lies
in the fact that cities are polycentric instead of being monocentric. However, once
t > max{6ΥK, tp −6ΥK} there is a second equilibrium path in which the economy
displays a large polycentric city and a small monocentric city, with asymmetric trade
in the diﬀerentiated product. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the location of
ﬁrms and workers smoothly reacts to a marginal change in trade costs. Indeed,








Thus, as the global economy gets more and more integrated, less and less ﬁrms
and workers are agglomerated in the large city. The partial redispersion of the
economic activity is now gradual and not abrupt. Yet, λ∗ > 1/2 when τ = 0
because t > 6ΥK. In other words, the large city always hosts the majority of mobile
activities when communication costs are suﬃciently low for the decentralization of
production within that city to arise.
When 2ΥK > t > ΥK, high trade costs are compatible with two very contrasted
equilibrium paths. Along the ﬁrst one, the economy involves two monocentric cities
for all admissible values of the trade costs. However, when t is lower than tp but
larger than ΥK, the economy may also be agglomerated in a single polycentric city
(see Figure 3). Despite the dispersion force generated by urban costs, a gradual fall
in trade costs over a large interval of τ values is consistent with agglomeration in a
polycentric city. This is because commuting costs are suﬃciently low with respect
to trade costs for the polycentric city to guarantee urban costs that prevent the
dispersion of activities. Yet, when trade costs decrease suﬃciently for t to exceed tp
while being smaller than 2ΥK, two moncentric cities then emerge. This is because
trade costs are now suﬃciently low with respect to commuting costs.
To conclude, it appears that the large city is often able to maintain its primacy in
the sense that dispersion does not arise once trade costs take low values   especially
when commuting costs are not very low   as it does in other economic geography
models with urban costs. This suﬃces to show that the development of urban SBDs
may deeply aﬀect the shape of the global economy.
10In order to avoid diﬀerent subcases that do not add to our results, we assume that tm < 2ΥK
so that tm does not appear in Figure 3. Such an inequality holds when am > a > ap (see sections
4.1 and 4.2.). We also assume that tp − 6ΥK < 6ΥK for all admissible trade cost values, which
implies that an interior equilibrium emerges provided that t > 6ΥK (see Proposition 4).
186 Concluding remarks
We have presented a simple model that uncovers how the interplay between diﬀerent
types of spatial friction aﬀects the location of economic activities between and within
cities. Historical evidence shows that both trade and commuting costs have been
decreasing since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Ever since the end of the
19th century, the development of the new communication technologies has allowed
ﬁrms to alleviate the burden of urban costs in large metropolitan areas, through
the emergence of secondary employment centers. We have shown how these various
technological changes have impacted on the way ﬁrms and workers locate; our results
agree with empirical evidence. Thus, we may safely conclude that what matters for
the organization of the space economy is the relative evolution of three types of
costs: the commuting of workers, the transfer of information and the transport of
commodities.
When cities are open to trade, the organization of the space-economy varies with
the ability of cities to accommodate a small or a large population in the monocen-
tric arrangement. For example, with low commuting costs and high communication
costs, we obtain the bell shaped curve of spatial development as trade costs keep
decreasing. With high commuting costs and low communication costs, the picture
is quite diﬀerent. More precisely, when trade costs fall from high levels, the econ 
omy moves gradually from dispersion to agglomeration. Once agglomeration within
a polycentric city has been achieved, the core maintains its primacy over a large
range of trade cost values, thus conﬁrming the idea that the polycentric structure
fosters agglomeration. Our results also highlight the importance of local factors
in the emergence of regional inequalities. For example, we have seen that global
agglomeration is more likely to occur when commuting costs take very low values.
Last, note that the multiplicity of stable equilibria has an important implication
that has been very much overlooked in the literature: diﬀerent types of spatial pat-
terns may coexist under identical technological and economic conditions. It should
be no surprise, therefore, to observe a variety of urban systems in the real world.
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Appendix
In what follows, we determine the equilibrium wages when both cities are polycentric
(case A) and when one city is polycentric whereas the other is monocentric (case
B).
Case A. The corresponding equilibrium wages (wC
r and wS
r for r = 1,2) are
such that all ﬁrms, located either in the CBD or in the SBD of each city, earn zero
proﬁts (given, respectively, by (3) and (4)). More precisely, the equilibrium wages















[2aφ + τcL(1 − λ)]2λ + [2aφ − 2τbφ − τcL(1 − λ)]2(1 − λ)
￿
is quadratic in λ; a similar expression holds for wC
2 (λ) and wS
2(λ).
Case B. When city 1 is polycentric whereas city 2 is monocentric (θ∗
1 < 1 and
θ∗
2 = 1), the equilibrium wages (wC
1 , wS
1 and wC
2 ) are such that no ﬁrm established
in city 1 and located either in the CBD or in the SBD of this city, or established in
the CBD of city 2 is able to make positive proﬁts. More precisely, they are given by











(2aφ + τcLλ)2(1 − λ) + (2aφ − 2τbφ − τcLλ)2λ
￿
is quadratic in λ.
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